In this paper, we offer for two-person games an alternative characterization of 
Introduction
In a recent paper, Saglam (2016) proposed a new n-person bargaining solution, called Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise (IKSNC), which reconciles between the well-known solutions of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky using no more information than is already contained in these solutions. He also showed that this new solution can be characterized by a single axiom called 1 Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Decomposability, which requires that the outcome of the solution on any bargaining problem can be obtained by first calculating the referential compromise point at which each player receives the minimum of the utility payoffs he or she would have received under the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions, and then adding this point to the solution of the subproblem admitting it as both the starting and the disagreement point.
1
The procedure of repeated use of a concept for defining a solution was introduced by Raiffa (1953) in the definition of the discrete (sequential) Raiffa solution. For an alternative characterization of the same solution, this procedure was recently translated by Trockel (2015) into an axiom, called Repeated Application of the Same Solution (RASS), which is a weakening of an earlier axiom of Kalai (1977) , called Step by Step Negotiations. by Trockel (2015) , it satisfies, for two-person games, a similar property which we call Γ-Decomposability.
3 Given a referential solution Γ, this axiom is satisfied by any solution F if it chooses on any (well-defined) problem S an allocation point that can be obtained by adding the reference solution point Γ(S) to the solution of F on the utilities in S that are not smaller than Γ(S).
The main result of this paper is that in a two-person bargaining setup the IK-SNC solution is the unique solution that satisfies the axiom of Γ-Decomposability when the solution Γ satisfies the axioms of IEUR and SY along with three addi-1 The solution of Saglam (2015) can be obtained by the repeated use of an axiom of Rachmilevitch (2014), called Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Robustness (KSNR) . This axiom requires that each agent receives at least the minimum of the utility payoffs he or she would have received under the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions.
2 This axiom of Kalai (1977) requires that for any two bargaining problems S and S with S ⊇ S and the disagreement points normalized to zero, the solution on S can be obtained by first calculating the solution on S and then taking it to be the starting point for the distribution of the utilities in S to calculate the solution on this normalized set.
3 Various forms of decomposability axioms were earlier used by Salonen (1988) , Rachmilevitch (2012) , Saglam (2014), and Trockel (2014) subset S that contains for each player the individually best extension of the solution on S, then for each player the individually best extension of the solution on S and on S must be the same. Finally, the axiom of RMIBE requests that if a bargaining set S expands to a set S with the ideal point being unchanged, then the individually best extension of the solution on S for some player must be weakly Pareto superior to the individually best extension of the solution on S for at least one of the players. In our characterization result, the axiom of WIIA is needed because of the dependence of the KSNC solution on the Nash solution. On the other hand, the axiom of RMIBE accounts for the dependence of the KSNC solution on the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. However, RMIBE neither implies nor is implied by the Restricted Monotonicity axiom used by Roth (1979) in an alternative characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for two-person games.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic structures and Section 3 presents our axiomatization results. Finally, Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
Basic Structures
We consider a two-person bargaining problem (simply a problem) denoted by a nonempty subset S of R 2 + , representing von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities attainable through the cooperative actions of two agents. If the agents fail to agree on any point in S, then each of them gets zero utility (i.e., the disagreement 3 utility is normalized yo zero). We also assume that (a) S is compact and convex and there exists x ∈ S such that x > 0; 4 (b) for all x, y ∈ R 2 + , i.e., if x ∈ S and x ≥ y ≥ 0, then y ∈ S (comprehensiveness or the possibility of free disposal of utility).
Let Σ 2 0 denote the set of all 0-normalized two-person bargaining problems satisfying the above assumptions. We define a solution F on Σ 2 0 as a mapping from Σ 2 0 to R 2 + such that for each S ∈ Σ 2 0 , F (S) ∈ S. The solution by Nash (1950) maps each problem S ∈ Σ 2 0 to the point N (S) = argmax x∈S x 1 x 2 , at which the product of players' payoff gains from agreement is maximized. Below, we will present the set of axioms used by Nash (1950) for an arbitrary solution
Let the weak and the strong Pareto frontier of any set S ∈ R 2 + be respectively defined as W P (S) = {x ∈ S | y > x implies y / ∈ S} and P (S) = {x ∈ S | y ≥ x and y = x implies y / ∈ S}.
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO):
Any set S ∈ R 2 + is said to be symmetric if (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ S implies (x 2 , x 1 ) ∈ S.
Symmetry (SY):
If S ∈ Σ 2 0 and S is symmetric, then F 1 (S) = F 2 (S).
Let Λ be the set of all λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ) where each λ i : R → R is a positive affine function, and let λ(S) = {λ(x) : x ∈ S}.
Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR): If S ∈ Σ 2 0 and λ ∈ Λ, then F (λ(S)) = λ(F (S)).
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): If S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 , S ⊇ S , and
4 Given two vectors x and y in R 2 + , x > y means x i > y i for all i ∈ N and x ≥ y means x i ≥ y i for i = 1, 2.
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Nash (1950) showed that his solution is the unique solution that satisfies the axioms of IEUR, IIA, SY, and WPO. In fact, the Nash solution satisfies the strong version of the Pareto optimality, as well.
While the axioms of IEUR, SY, and WPO are satisfied by many well-known solutions and are therefore called the standard axioms in the bargaining literature, IIA has been a controversial axiom, having led the researchers to seek for alternative solutions that would satisfy more plausible axioms, possibly in addition to the standard axioms. In that respect, a well-known alternative is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) , which is based on the ideal (utopia) point of the given bargaining problem. Formally, for any bargaining set S, let a i (S) denote the maximal utility agent i can expect in S, i.e., a i (S) = max{x i : x ∈ S}. Then, for any bargaining problem S, the point a(S) = (a 1 (S), a 2 (S)) is called the ideal point. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution selects in each bargaining set the maximal point on the line segment joining the disagreement point to the ideal point. So, it maps each problem S ∈ Σ 2 0 to the point KS(S) ∈ W P (S) such that KS 1 (S)/KS 2 (S) = a 1 (S)/a 2 (S), implying that each player's payoff gain from agreement has the same proportion to his or her ideal payoff gain from agreement. Kalai (1975) 
For two-person problems IM can be replaced by a weaker axiom called Restricted Monotonicity, as shown by Roth (1979) . This axiom requires that both players should weakly benefit from an expansion of the bargaining set if the ideal point does not change.
Restricted Monotonicity (RM): If S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 , S ⊇ S, and a(S ) = a(S),
From the characterization results of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions for two-person games, it should become evident that these two solutions are distinguished from each other only by whether they possess RM or IIA. In situations where it may be necessary to reconcile between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions (or alternatively between the axioms of RM and IIA), one can use the compromise point in Rachmilevitch (2014) to define a benchmark solution. Formally, given any problem S, the said compromise point is the al-
Then, consider the solution that maps each problem S ∈ Σ 2 0 to the point C(S). We will call this solution Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise (KSNC).
Obviously, KSNC is not a desirable solution because it does not satisfy WPO. However, as observed by Saglam (2016) , one can iterate KSNC to obtain a limit point on the weak Pareto frontier of a given problem. Formally, given any problem S ∈ Σ 2 0 and any point a ∈ S, define S − {a} = {y ∈ R 2 : y =
x − a for some x ∈ S}. Then, consider the sequence of points (c t (S)) ∞ t=0 where c 0 (S) = 0, and c
The solution that maps each problem S ∈ Σ 
Results
We will first study the KSNC solution in its relation to the axioms introduced in Section 2. (Below, we denote by co(S) the convex-hull of the set S.)
Remark 1. The KSNC solution satisfies both of the axioms IEUR and SY, but it does not satisfy any of the axioms IIA, RM, and WPO.
Proof. Below, we will check for each axiom in the remark.
IEUR: Let S ∈ Σ 2 0 . Since the solutions of Nash (N ) and Kalai-Smorodinsky (K) both satisfy IEUR, for any vector of positive affine functions λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ) 6 it is true that N (λ(S)) = λ(N (S)) and
IIA: Let S = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 0)}. Clearly, S ∈ Σ 2 0 . It is easy to check that N (S) = (1, 1) and K(S) = (4/3, 2/3). Therefore, C(S) = (1, 2/3). Now, consider S = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (4/3, 2/3), (4/3, 0)}.
Clearly, S ∈ Σ 2 0 , S ⊇ S , and C(S) ∈ S . Also, it is easy to check that N (S ) = (1, 1) while K(S ) = (8/7, 6/7), implying C(S ) = (1, 6/7). Since C(S ) = C(S), we conclude that C does not satisfy IIA.
SY: Let S ∈ Σ 2 0 be such that S is symmetric. Since both of the solutions N and K satisfy SY and WPO, N (S) = K(S) and N 1 (S) = N 2 (S). Then, So, C(S ) / ∈ W P (S), implying that C does not satisfy WPO.
Now, we will axiomatize the KSNC solution after introducing a number of axioms defined for an arbitrary solution F on Σ 2 0 . We will first weaken WPO.
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Weak Pareto Optimality under Symmetry (WPO-S): If S ∈ Σ 2 0 is such that it is symmetric, then F (S) ∈ W P (S).
For any problem S ∈ Σ 2 0 , let us denote by b i (S, y) the best allocation player i can expect in P (S), given that agent j = i obtains at least y j units of utility.
We will call the allocation b i (S, y) the individually best extension of y on S for player i.
Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (WIIA): If S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 , S ⊇ S , and b i (S, F (S)) ∈ S for every i ∈ {1, 2}, then there exists j ∈ {1, 2}
WIIA simply requires that if a bargaining set S contracts to a subset S that contains for every player the individually best extension of the solution on S, then for some player the individually best extension of the solution on S and S must be the same. This axiom weakens the independence axiom, IIA, of Nash (1950), as illustrated by the below remarks.
Remark 2. IIA implies WIIA.
Proof. Let F be a solution on Σ 2 0 that satisfies IIA and let S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 be such that S ⊇ S and b i (S, F (S)) ∈ S for every i ∈ {1, 2}. Then F (S) ∈ S by the comprehensiveness of S . On the other hand, IIA implies that F (S ) = F (S). Then, we have b 1 (S , F (S )) = b 1 (S , F (S)). Note that b 1 (S, F (S)) ∈ S by assumption and b 1 (S, F (S)) ∈ P (S) by the definition of b 1 . Thus,
Since we also have b 1 (S , F (S)) ∈ P (S ) by the definition of b 1 , we
Remark 3. WIIA does not imply IIA.
Proof. Let S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 be such that S ⊇ S , and b i (S, C(S)) ∈ S for every i ∈ {1, 2}. We have C i (S) = min{KS i (S), N i (S)} for every i ∈ {1, 2}, by the definition of the KSNC solution. Since N satisfies PO, there exists k ∈ {1, 2} such that b k (S, C(S)) = N (S), implying N (S) ∈ S due to the assumption about S . Moreover, N (S ) = N (S), since N satisfies IIA. By the definition of C, it follows that there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that C j (S ) = N j (S ). Along with N j (S ) = N j (S), this implies C j (S ) = N j (S). Then, for k = j we must have
. So, the KSNC solution satisfies WIIA. On the other hand, Remark 1 shows that the KSNC solution does not satisfy IIA.
Restricted Monotonicity of Individually Best Extensions (RMIBE): If
S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 , S ⊇ S, and a(S ) = a(S), then there exists j ∈ {1, 2} and k ∈ {1, 2} such that
The above axiom requires that if a bargaining set S expands to a set S with no change in the ideal point, then the individually best extension of the solution on S for some player must be weakly Pareto superior to the individually best extension of the solution on S for at least one of the players. As will be shown below, this new axiom neither implies nor is implied by the axiom of RM.
Remark 4. RMIBE does not imply RM.
Proof. LetŜ = co{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)}. Clearly,Ŝ ∈ Σ 2 0 . Let F be a solution on Σ 2 0 such that
(1/2, 0) ifS =Ŝ.
Step 1: Let S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 be such that S ⊇ S and a(S ) = a(S). If S = S, then the condition for RMIBE trivially holds. So, let S = S. First assume that S = S. Then, F (S) = (3/4, 0), whereas F (S ) = (1/2, 0), since S =Ŝ. It follows that b 1 (S , F (S )) = b 1 (S, F (S)) = (1, 0) since a(S ) = a(S) by assumption and a(S) = a(Ŝ) = (1, 1). Therefore, for j = 1 and k = 1, the inequality
So, it is true that for j = 1 and k = 1, the inequality
Step 2: We will show that F does not satisfy RM. Let S =Ŝ and S = 9 co{(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (0, 1)}. Clearly, S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 , S ⊇ S, and a(S ) = a(S). In order F to satisfy RM, the inequality F (S ) ≥ F (S) must hold. But, we have F (S ) = (1/2, 0) and F (S) = (3/4, 0), violating this inequality.
Remark 5. RM does not imply RMIBE.
Proof. LetŜ = co{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)}. (Note thatŜ ∈ Σ 2 0 .) Also let F be a solution on Σ 2 0 such that
Step 1. Let S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 be such that S ⊇ S and a(S ) = a(S). If S = S, the condition for RMIBE trivially holds, thus let S = S. Note that S cannot be equal toŜ. (For otherwise S would also be equal toŜ since W P (Ŝ) = P (Ŝ).)
This implies F (S ) = K(S ). As to S, we have two possibilities. If S =Ŝ, then F (S) = (0, 0). Since K(S ) > (0, 0), the inequality F (S ) ≥ F (S) would be satisfied. On the other hand, if S =Ŝ, then F (S) = K(S). Along with the fact that F (S ) = K(S ), this implies F (S ) ≥ F (S), since K satisfies RM. We have established that the inequality F (S ) ≥ F (S) always holds. Thus, F satisfies RM.
Step 2. Let S =Ŝ and S = co{(0, 0), (1, 0), (3/4, 3/4), (0, 1)}. Apparently, S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 , S ⊇ S, and a(S ) = a(S) = (1, 1). It follows that F (S) = (0, 0) and
S)) cannot hold for any j, k ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, F does not satisfy RMIBE.
The following remark implies that the axiom of RMIBE is satisfied by any solution that satisfies both RM and PO (e.g. the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution).
Remark 6. RM and PO together imply RMIBE.
Proof. Let F be a solution that satisfies RM and PO, and consider any S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 be such that S ⊇ S and a(S ) = a i (S). If S = S, the condition for RMIBE trivially holds. So, let S = S. Note that b j (S , F (S )) = F (S ) for every j ∈ {1, 2} and b k (S, F (S)) = F (S) for every k ∈ {1, 2} by PO. More- F (S) ) for every j, k ∈ {1, 2}, which ensures that F satisfies RMIBE. Now, we are ready to introduce our first characterization result. . Since both N and K satisfy SY and WPO, we must have N (S) = K(S), implying C(S) = N (S). Therefore, C(S) ∈ W P (S), implying WPO-S is satisfied. Finally, to show that the KSNC solution also satisfies RMIBE, let S, S ∈ Σ 2 0 be such that S ⊇ S and a(S ) = a(S). If S = S, the condition of RMIBE trivially holds. So, let S = S. By the definition of the solution C, we know that C j (S ) = K j (S ) for some j ∈ {1, 2} and C k (S) = K k (S) for some k ∈ {1, 2}. Consider players m, n ∈ {1, 2} such that m = j and n = k.
Then, we must have b m (S , C(S )) = K(S ) and b n (S, C(S)) = K(S). Finally,
. Thus, the KSNC solution satisfies RMIBE.
"⇐": Pick any solution F on Σ 2 0 that satisfies IEUR, RMIBE, SY, WIIA, and WPO-S. Let S ∈ Σ 2 0 .
Step 1: Since the solution N satisfies IEUR, there exists a vector of positive affine functions λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ) such that (1, 1) = N (λ (S)). Then, let S = λ (S).
Consider T = co{(0, 0), (0, 2), (2, 0)}. As T is symmetric and F satisfies SY and WPO-S, we have F (T ) = (1, 1). Then, for every i ∈ {1, 2} we have b i (T, F (T )) =
(1, 1), while we already know that (1, 1) ∈ S . Since F also satisfies WIIA, there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that b j (S , F (S )) = b j (T, F (T )) = (1, 1). Using
(1, 1) = N (S ), we then have b j (S , F (S )) = N (S ) for some j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, using S = λ (S) along with the fact that both F and N satisfy IEUR, we can replace b j (S , F (S )) and N (S ) in the above equality with λ (b j (S, F (S))) and λ (N (S)), respectively. This would imply that there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that
Step 2: Since the solution K satisfies IEUR, there exists a vector of positive affine functions λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ) such that (1, 1) = K(λ (S)). Then, let S =
, it follows that a 1 (S ) = a 2 (S ), implying that T is symmetric. Then, F (T ) = (1, 1), because F satisfies SY and WPO-S. Note also that S ⊇ T and a(S ) = a(T ). Since F satisfies RMIBE, there exist j, k ∈ {1, 2} such
. This is equivalent to saying that there exists j such that b j (S , F (S )) ≥ K(S ), since (1, 1) = K(S ). Finally, using S = λ (S) along with the fact that both F and K satisfy IEUR, we can replace b j (S , F (S )) and K(S ) in the last inequality with λ (b j (S, F (S))) and λ (K(S)), respectively. This would imply that there exists j ∈ {1, 2}
definition. Moreover, K(S) ∈ P (S) since K satisfies PO. Thus, we must have
Steps 1 and 2 respectively show that b j (S, F (S)) = N (S) for some j ∈ {1, 2} and b k (S, F (S)) = K(S) for some k ∈ {1, 2}. So, it must be true that F (S) =
C(S).
Obviously, the KSNC solution also satisfies a stronger version of WPO-S, which we call PO-S, since both of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash solutions satisfy the axiom of PO and the bargaining sets are assumed to be convex.
Pareto Optimality under Symmetry (PO-S): If S ∈ Σ 2 0 and S is symmetric, then F (S) ∈ P (S). Now, we will consider the characterization of the IKSNC solution. However, we first observe the following. 
Iterating this equation t more times yields
given any S ∈ Σ 2 0 , the IKSNC solution selects the allocation lim t→∞ c t (S 0 ) in S. Now suppose that F (S 0 ) = lim t→∞ c t (S 0 ). Then, one can easily show by the geometry of the rule F that there exists k ≥ 0 such that F (S k+1 ) / ∈ S k+1 , a contradiction. Therefore, F (S 0 ) = lim t→∞ c t (S 0 ). Since S ∈ Σ 2 0 was arbitrarily picked, F must coincide with the IKSNC solution.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to offer, for two-person games, an alterna- The future research might extend our work to n-person games. We should recall here that the characterization of the IKSNC solution critically depends on the characterization of the KSNC solution that chooses for each player the minimum of the utility payoffs he or she would have received under the KalaiSmorodinsky and Nash solutions. As already known, the axiomatization result by Nash (1950) for two-person games straightforwardly extends to n-person games. On the other hand, for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution axiomatization results are nontrivially different for the two-person and n-person games (when n ≥ 3) as shown by the work of .
5 Thus, one may conjecture that the axiomatization of the KSNC solution could also be different for the two types of games.
